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CHANDRIS, INC. v. LATSIS AND THE TEST FOR SEAMAN
STATUS: THE SUPREME COURT MUDDIES THE WATERS
AGAIN
On June 14, 1995, the Supreme Court issued its decision in
Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis,' revising for the second time in four
years the much-contested standard for Jones Act2 seaman sta-
tus. A worker seeking Jones Act coverage now must show that,
in addition to doing the ship's work,' he has a connection to a
vessel or fleet that is substantial, both in nature and in dura-
tion.4 By leaving some traditional seamen vulnerable to the per-
ils of the sea, the Latsis test is inconsistent with the policy of
the Jones Act.
The Jones Act provides remedies for injured seamen, allowing
them to sue their employers for negligence.5 Seamen are not
covered by state compensation systems; instead, activities on the
water are covered by admiralty.6 Traditionally, maritime law
has sought to foster commerce by protecting investors and
shipowners, often at the expense of seamen.' Until this century,
maritime law had precluded seamen's recovery beyond mainte-
nance and cure.8
1. 115 S. Ct. 2172 (1995).
2. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1994) (stating the procedures for recovery for injury to,
or death of, seamen).
3. See Latsis, 115 S. Ct. at 2190 (citing McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498
U.S. 337, 355 (1991) (holding that a necessary element of a seaman's employment-
related connection to a vessel in navigation is that the seaman perform the work of
the vessel)).
4. See id.
5. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 688.
6. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917) (holding that state
workmen's compensation statutes may not be used to enforce injury compensation to
maritime workers); see also THOmAS J. SCHOENBAUM, AD~mIALTY AND MARITiE LAW
§ 1-18 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing the doctrinal and theoretical bases for admirality ju-
risdiction).
7. See Robert M. Jarvis, Maritime Personal Injury Law in the 21st Century, in
MARITIE PERSONAL INJURY LITIGATION 1, 3 (1992) (describing early 20th century at-
titudes toward seamen's rights).
8. See John W. Sims, The American Law of Maritime Personal Injury and Death:
An Historical Review, 55 TUL. L. REV. 973 (1981); see generally John B. Shields,
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The Jones Act, enacted in 1920, was an attempt to help sea-
men by providing them with legal remedies for injuries caused
by the negligence of their employers.9 Debate over who should
receive those remedies, however, has created nearly as many
problems as the Jones Act has solved." Although some workers
clearly qualify as seamen, the courts have had difficulty distin-
guishing other seamen from land-based workers." The Jones
Act's generous remedies" have made seaman status a hotly
contested and frequently litigated issue for injured workers and
their employers."
The Supreme Court, in 1991, attempted to define seaman sta-
tus in McDermott International, Inc. v. Wilander.4 Wilander
resolved the conflict between two popular approaches to the is-
sue,15 one from the Fifth Circuit 6 and the other from the Sev-
enth. 7 The Court left many questions unanswered and confu-
Seamen's Rights to Recover Maintenance and Cure Benefits, 55 TUL. L. REV. 1046
(1981) (discussing the remedy of maintenance and cure).
9. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 688; see also Sims, supra note 8, at 988-89 (noting that
the Jones Act has provided both procedural and substantive benefits to negligently
induced seamen).
10. "The perils of the sea . . . have met their match in the perils of judicial re-
view." GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 6-1 (2d
ed. 1975).
11. "[The myriad circumstances in which men go upon the water confront courts
not with discrete classes of maritime employees, but rather with a spectrum ranging
from the blue-water seaman to the land-based longshoreman." Brown v. ITT
Rayonier, Inc., 497 F.2d 234, 236 (5th Cir. 1974).
12. See infra note 55 for a description of recoverable damages. But cf Joseph D.
Cheavens, Terminal Workers' Injury and Death Claims, 64 TUL. L. REV. 361, 365-67
(1989) (arguing that Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33
U.S.C. § 901 (1994), benefits may be preferable to a Jones Act recovery).
13. See generally Senko v. LaCrosse Dredging Corp., 352 U.S. 370 (1957) (finding
that a worker on a dredge anchored to shore was a seaman); Palmer v. Fayard
Moving & Transp. Corp., 930 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1991) (denying seaman status to a
land-based public relations officer); Barrett v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 781 F.2d 1067
(5th Cir. 1986) (holding that an offshore oil worker was not a seaman).
14. 498 U.S. 337 (1991).
15. See id. at 340.
16. See Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 779 (5th Cir. 1959) (holding that to
qualify for seaman status, a worker must "contribute[ ] to the function of [a] vessel
or to the accomplishment of its mission").
17. See Johnson v. John F. Beasley Constr. Co., 742 F.2d 1054, 1061 (7th Cir.
1984) (holding that seamen status requires that a worker contribute to the transpor-
tation function of the vessel).
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sion continued in the lower courts. 8 In Latsis, the Court
amended the Wilander definition of seaman status, further re-
stricting the scope of the Jones Act. 9 By shifting the bound-
aries of seaman status, the Court has reduced potential liability
for maritime employers and closed remedies to injured seamen.
The Latsis opinion will have far-reaching effect.
In applying the Jones Act, Justice Cardozo wrote in Warner v.
Goltra" that "the purpose... of [the] statute.., must be read
in the light of the mischief to be corrected and the end to be at-
tained."2' In Latsis, the Court has purported to do just that.'
This Note assesses the judiciary's success in explaining the pur-
pose of the Jones Act and in correcting the mischief that it was
,designed to remedy. By reviewing the background of the Jones
Act and the case law leading up to the Wilander decision, this
Note analyzes judicial interpretation of the Act's purpose.
Through a critical discussion and comparison of Wilander and
Latsis, this Note demonstrates the Court's mistakes in crafting
its new definition of seaman. Finally, drawing on the history of
Jones Act jurisprudence, this Note suggests a more appropriate
approach to seaman status.
The Supreme Court needs to enunciate a more complete test
for seaman status rooted firmly in the policy considerations of
the Jones Act. This test should distinguish between land-based
and sea-based employees by granting seaman status to those
attached to a vessel at sea, without further consideration. The
test should direct application of the factors identified in Latsis
and Wilander to more ambiguous situations.
18. See generally Bach v. Trident S.S., 920 F.2d 322 (5th Cir.) (holding that a
river boat pilot was not a seaman), vacated and remanded, 500 U.S. 949, reinstated,
947 F.2d 1290 (5th Cir. 1991).
19. See Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 115 S. Ct. 2172, 2189-90 (1995).
20. 293 U.S. 155 (1934) (holding that ship masters are seamen under the Jones Act).
21. Id. at 158.
22. See Latsis, 115 S. Ct. at 2185 (defining the Court's task as that of developing
a status-based standard that best furthers the remedial goals of the Jones Act).
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BACKGROUND OF THE JONES ACT
In 1896, Patrick Shea, a crew member aboard the propeller
Osceola, was struck and injured by a falling derrickY This acci-
dent began nearly a century of litigation over legal remedies for
seamen and the eligibility of workers to receive these remedies.
Shea sued the Osceola's owners for the master's negligence in
ordering the use of the derrick at open sea.' In denying Shea's
claims, the Supreme Court severely limited a seaman's ability to
recover for his injuries.'
The Court determined in The Osceola that general maritime
law limited the rights of Shea and other seamen to four proposi-
tions.26 First, when a seaman became ill or was wounded in the
ship's service, the vessel and its owners were liable for his
maintenance and cure27 and for his wages, "at least so long as
the voyage [was] continued."' Second, the vessel and its own-
ers were liable for injuries to a seaman caused by the unseawor-
thiness of the vessel.29 Third, except for the ship's master, all
the crew members were fellow servants of each other." The
vessel and its owners thus were not liable to a seaman for inju-
ries caused by another seaman's negligence, beyond the reme-
dies of maintenance and cure. 1 Fourth, a seaman could not
recover in an indemnity action for the negligence of the ship's
master. 2 Again, he was entitled only to maintenance and
cure.
33
Under The Osceola, a seaman injured by negligence, whether
that of the ship's master or of a fellow servant, had no right to
23. See The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 159 (1903).
24. See id. at 159-60.
25. See id. at 177.
26. See i& at 175.
27. For a definition and discussion of maintenance and cure, see Shields, supra
note 8. The right to maintenance and cure dates back to the early middle ages. See
id. at 1046. It is available regardless of fault and extends until the maximum pos-
sible cure is reached. See id. at 1047.
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damages beyond maintenance and cure." The Osceola's holding
incorporated the fellow servant defenses and the doctrine of
assumption of the risk,3 theories that originated in cases in-
volving land-based workers, denying seamen the ability to sue
their employers in a negligence cause of action.17 In 1908, Con-
gress restricted the application of the fellow servant defense and
the doctrine of assumption of the risk in railway workers' suits
by enacting the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA).5 This
legislation was a breakthrough for railway workers, granting
them a negligence cause of action against their employers. 9
Congress attempted similar reform for seamen in the
Seaman's Act of 1915.' Intended as a legislative veto of The
Osceola's holding, the 1915 Act provided that a seaman in com-
mand of other seamen is not a fellow servant with those under
his authority.41 The Osceola had provided that seamen were
fellow servants with everyone on board except the ship's
master.42 Under The Osceola, the fellow servant defense re-
stricted a seaman injured by the negligence of his superior offi-
34. See id.
35. The fellow servant defense shielded employers from liability by preventing the
application of the doctrine of respondeat superior when a worker injured a fellow
worker. See Murray v. South Carolina R.R, 26 S.C.L. (1 McMul.) 385 (1841) (apply-
ing the fellow servant defense).
36. As applied in The Osceola, the doctrine of assumption of the risk precluded
employer liability because a worker, by accepting employment, assumed the risk of
injury by a dangerous working condition that he could have discovered if he had
been alert. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 6, § 3-11; see also Priestley v. Fowler, 150
Eng. Rep. 1030, 1032-33 (1837) (explaining that workers are not required to risk
their safety for their employer and may decline a position that involves the likeli-
hood of injury). Encountering negligent fellow servants was a risk that a worker as-
sumed by accepting employment. See Bartonshill Coal Co. v. Reid, 20 Sess. Cas. (D.)
13, 14-15 (H.L. 1858).
37. See, e.g., Murray, 26 S.C.L. at 385 (involving railroad workers); Priestly, 150
Eng. Rep. at 1030 (involving a butcher).
38. Ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65 (1908) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1994)).
39. See MORRIS D. FORKOSCH, A TREATISE ON LABOR LAW § 58 (1965).
40. Ch. 153, § 20, 38 Stat. 1164, 1185 (1915) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C.
app. § 688 (1994)).
41. See id.; see generally Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155, 159 (1934) (describing
the Seaman's Act of 1915 as "aimed at the fellow-servant rule in its application to
torts upon navigable waters").
42. See The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903) ("[A]ll the members of the crew,
except perhaps the master, are, as between themselves, fellow servants.").
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cer to maintenance and cure.43 By declaring that a seaman was
not a fellow servant of his superior officer, Congress apparently
intended that the Seaman's Act of 1915 would allow seamen to
sue the vessel and its owners for the negligence of their superior
officers, thereby softening The Osceola's harsh ruling.
Congress, however, overlooked The Osceola's provision that
barred suits to recover for the negligence of any crew member
beyond the remedies of maintenance and cure." Thus, even
though the Seaman's Act of 1915 declared that a seaman was no
longer a fellow servant of his superior officer, he still could not
recover for the superior officer's negligence. The Supreme Court
highlighted this error in Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S., pointing
out that the 1915 Act did not affect The Osceola's prohibition of
a seaman's recovery for the negligence of a crew member.45
Congress went back to the drawing board, emerging in 1920
with the Jones Act,4 modeled after FELA.47 The Jones Act
granted a negligence cause of action to seamen injured in the
course of employment and extended to them the rights that
FELA provided to railway workers. Under the Jones Act, the
injured seaman may elect to sue in admiralty or at law with the
right to trial by jury in either federal or state court.48 The jury
may also decide general maritime law claims.49 Although judg-
es craft the standard for seaman status, the jury usually decides
whether a given plaintiff qualifies." If a seaman sues in state
43. See id. ("[Sleamen cannot recover for injuries sustained through the negligence
of another member of the crew beyond the expense of their maintenance and cure.").
44. See id. ("[Tihe seaman is not allowed to recover an indemnity for the negligence
of the master, or any member of the crew, but is entitled to maintenance and cure.").
45. See Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S., 247 U.S. 372, 380-84 (1918).
46. Merchant Marine (Jones) Act, ch. 250, § 33, 41 Stat. 988, 1007 (1920) (codified
at 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1994)).
47. See generally Swanson v. Marra Bros., 328 U.S. 1, 3 (1946) ("The [Jones]
Act . . . made applicable to seamen, injured in the course of their employment, the
provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act."); O'Donnell v. Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36, 38-39 (1943) (characterizing the Jones Act as an
extension of FELA benefits to seamen).
48. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 688(a). Generally, admiralty does not provide a right to a
jury trial. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 6, § 18-9.
49. See Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16 (1963) (holding that
general maintenance and cure claims that are joined with Jones Act claims must be
submitted to the jury when they both arise out of the same set of facts).
50. See generally Peter Beer, Keeping up with the Jones Act, 61 TUL. L. REV. 379,
728 [Vol. 38:723
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court, the defendant does not have the right of removal.51 The
locality test, which defines admiralty jurisdiction,52 does not ap-
ply in Jones Act cases; therefore, seamen injured on land may be
covered." The Jones Act allows the personal representative of a
deceased seaman to maintain an action.' Under the Act, an
injured seaman may recover generous benefits.55
Congress failed to define the term "seaman" in the Jones Act.
Ironically, the most complete statutory definition of the term
appears in another act, the Longshore and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act (LHWCA).5 6 Prior to the enactment of the
LHWCA, longshoremen and harbor workers had recovered as
seamen under the Jones Act.5" In excluding seamen from its
coverage, the LHWCA employs the most complete statutory
definition of a seaman: "a master or member of a crew of any
406-09 (1986) (considering the impact of assigning the decision to juries and suggest-
ing that judges are better able to decide who is a seaman).
51. See Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33, 37-38 (1926) (establishing that a Jones
Act claim filed in a state court of competent jurisdiction may not be removed to fed -
eral court).
52. Under the locality test, a tort is within admiralty jurisdiction if it is caused
by an occurrence on navigable waters. See The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20, 33
(1865). Congress has codified the locality test: "[The admiralty and maritime juris-
diction of the United States shall extend to and include all cases of damage or inju-
ry, to person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding
that such damage or injury be done or consummated on land." 46 U.S.C. app. § 740.
53. See O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36 (1943) (award-
ing Jones Act recovery to a deckhand who was on shore performing repairs for his
vessel when he was injured).
54. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 688(a).
55. An injured seaman may recover lost past wages, lost future wage earning
capacity, past and future medical expenses, and pain and suffering, including psycho-
logical suffering. See SCHOETBAUM, supra note 6, § 4-18.
56. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950, 902(3)(G) (1994); see generally Cheavens, supra note
12, at 369-73 (describing the legislative and judicial history behind the enactment of
the LHWCA).
57. See International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50 (1926) (granting sea-
man status to a longshoreman). In the years immediately following passage of the
LHWCA, the Supreme Court continued to find seaman status for shore-based workers.
See generally Uravic v. F. Jarka Co., 282 U.S. 234 (1931) (granting seaman status to a
stevedore); Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635 (1930) (holding that a longshoreman
injured on a vessel in navigable waters was entitled to coverage as a seaman). Later
cases and statutory amendments curtailed the extension of seaman status to land-
based maritime employees. See infra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
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vessel.""8 Since the passage of the LHWCA, this language has
formed the basis for most seaman status analyses."
EARLY JoNEs ACT JURISPRUDENCE: THE ACTIVITIES-BASED TEST
In its early Jones Act cases, the Supreme Court determined
seaman status based on the worker's activities, comparing the
worker's duties to traditional seaman activities."° The Court
rejected the locality test as a method of determining seaman
status"1 and found that seaman status is fact-specific, 2 turn-
ing on the worker's duties, both those immediately at hand'
and those within the general scope of his employment.' For
Jones Act coverage, the worker must be a seaman, meaning that
he is engaged in activities customarily performed by seamen,
and must be injured in the course of his employment." The
Court used the LHWCA, interpreting it as exclusive of the Jones
Act, to gauge seaman status under the Jones Act."
In one of its earliest considerations of seaman status, Warner
v. Goltra,"7 the Court spoke of the purpose of the Jones Act in
terms of protecting seamen, who were "'ward[s] of the admiralty,'
often ignorant and helpless, and so in need of protection.... "'
In holding that the Jones Act applied to the ship's master as well
58. 33 U.S.C. § 902(3)(G).
59. See, e.g., Swanson v. Marra Bros., 328 U.S. 1, 6 (1946) (basing its denial of
seaman status for a worker upon the LHWCA); Gizoni v. Southwest Marine, Inc.,
909 F.2d 385, 388 (9th Cir. 1990), afld, 502 U.S. 81, 86-87 (1991) (holding that the
Jones Act and the LHWCA are not mutually exclusive).
60. See infra notes 62-94 and accompanying text.
61. See O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36, 42-43 (1943)
(establishing that seaman status does not depend on the place where injury was
inflicted, but on the nature of the employee's service to a vessel).
62. See Desper v. Starved Rock Ferry Co., 342 U.S. 187, 190 (1952) ("The many
cases turning upon the question whether an individual was a 'seaman' demonstrate
that the matter depends largely on the facts of the particular case and the activity
in which he was engaged at the time of injury.").
63. See id.
64. See, e.g., Senko v. LaCrosse Dredging Corp., 352 U.S. 370, 373 (1957) (finding
that a worker on a dredge anchored to shore was a seaman).
65. See O'Donnell, 318 U.S. at 39.
66. See Swanson v. Marra Bros., 328 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1946).
67. 293 U.S. 155 (1934).
68. Id. at 162.
730 [Vol. 38:723
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as to the crew, the Court found that master and crew were
equally vulnerable to injury.69 The Court stated that "a seaman
is a mariner of any degree, one who lives his life upon the
sea."70 The decisive factor in applying the Jones Act to the mas-
ter of the vessel was the master's vulnerability to injury.7'
In O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.,72 the Court
applied the Act to a deckhand who was injured while he was
ashore.7 ' Defining seamen as "those employed on a vessel in
rendering the services customarily performed by seamen,"74 the
Court concluded that the locus of the seaman's injury was less
important than his status as a seaman. 5 Seaman status turned
on "the nature of the [worker's] service and its relationship to
the operation of the vessel plying in navigable waters."76 Find-
ing that the Jones Act merely modified and did not supplant
general maritime law,7 the Court reasoned that Jones Act re-
covery, like the traditional maintenance and cure remedy, was
available to seamen injured on land.
Drawing on the distinction between shore-based and land-
based workers in the LHWCA, the Court in Swanson v. Marra
Bros.79 found that a longshoreman injured while loading a
docked vessel was not covered by the Jones Act." The worker,
already having received compensation under the Pennsylvania
employers' liability act, sought additional coverage under the
Jones Act.8' In denying seaman status for the worker, the
69. See idL ('Congress did not mean that the master, any more than the seaman,
should be left without a remedy if wounded in his body.").
70. Id. at 157; see also Norton v. Warner Co., 321 U.S. 565, 572 (1944) (holding
that "every one is entitled to the privilege of a seaman who, like seamen, at all
times contributes to the labors about the operation and welfare of the ship when she
is upon a voyage") (citing The Buena Ventura, 243 F. 797, 799 (S.D.N.Y. 1916)).
71. Warner, 293 U.S. at 162.
72. 318 U.S. 36 (1943).
73. See id.
74. Id. at 39.
75. See id. at 42-43.
76. Id.
77. See id. at 43.
78. See id. at 41-43.
79. 328 U.S. 1 (1946).
80. See id. at 7.
81. See id. at 2-3.
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Court explained that the "master or member of a crew" provision
in the LHWCAs2 confined Jones Act benefits to the crew mem-
bers of a vessel in navigation, and excluded shore-based workers
from the ranks of seamen." Defining Jones Act seaman status
with the aid of the LHWCA, the Court characterized the two
acts as mutually exclusive." LHWCA coverage precluded the
plaintiff from seeking Jones Act remedies.'
In Desper v. Starved Rock Ferry Co., the Court evaluated
seaman status according to the activity that the worker was
performing at the time of his injury." The worker in that case
was employed as a pilot by the owner of a fleet of sightseeing
vessels." The work was seasonal.' During the off-season,
when the vessels were moored out of the water, the worker was
killed in an accident while preparing a ship for the next sea-
son.89 Though conceding that the worker would have been a
seaman again later in the year, the Court overturned a jury
finding of seaman status, concluding that "at the time of his
82. 33 U.S.C. § 902(3)(G) (1994).
83. See Swanson, 328 U.S. at 7. Prior to the passage of the LHWCA, longshore-
men had found refuge under the Jones Act. See International Stevedoring Co. v.
Haverty, 272 U.S. 50 (1926) (granting Jones Act coverage to a longshoreman); supra
note 57 and accompanying text.
84. See Swanson, 328 U.S. at 6. But see Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni, 502 U.S.
81 (1991) (holding that the LHWCA and the Jones Act are not mutually exclusive).
85. See Swanson, 328 U.S. at 7. The Court continued, however, to grant LHWCA
workers traditional seamen's remedies. See Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S.
85 (1946). Sieracki held that a longshoreman covered by the LHWCA but performing
the traditional work of a seaman could sue the vessel on which he was injured for
unseaworthiness, a remedy previously available only to seamen. See id. at 99. This
decision extended the warranty of seaworthiness to shore-based workers doing a
seaman's work, thereby creating a new class of seamen, the Sieracki-seamen. See
generally Salgado v. M.J. Rudolph Corp., 514 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that a
longshoreman working aboard a vessel is a Sieracki-seaman and can recover for a
breach of the warranty of seaworthiness). The 1972 LHWCA Amendments prevented
unseaworthiness recovery by LHWCA workers and hence abolished the Sieracki class
of seamen. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of
1972 (amendments codified at 33 U.S.C. § 905(b)). See, e.g, McDermott Intl, Inc. v.
Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 347-48 (1991) (discussing Congress's legislative response to
Sieracki).
86. 342 U.S. 187, 190 (1952).
87. See id. at 188.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 188-89.
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death [the worker] quite clearly was not [engaged in work] usu-
ally done by a 'seaman'."' Stressing that the vessel was out of
navigation at the time of the accident, the Court declared that
the Jones Act "does not cover probable or expectant seamen but
seamen in being."9'
The early Supreme Court cases stressed the relationship of
the worker's duties to the traditional duty of seamen. The Court
excluded workers who were on board briefly92 and included
those drawn ashore only temporarily.93 Although the worker's
status as shore-based or sea-based undoubtedly played a role in
the analysis, the principal focus was on the relationship of the
worker's duties to seamen's work and to the risks faced by sea-
men.' The relation of the plaintiffs work to the duties of the
traditional seaman was a surrogate for the plaintiff's exposure to
a seaman's risks.
EMERGING POLICY IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS
Following the passage of the Jones Act, the circuit courts
carved out various approaches to defining seaman status, the
most prominent cases being the Fifth Circuit's decision in Off-
shore Co. v. Robison95 and the Seventh Circuit's decision in
Johnson v. John F. Beasley Construction Co.96 Other circuits
90. Id. at 190-91.
91. Id. at 191.
92. See id. (denying recovery to a boat operator killed while doing repairs to ves-
sels blocked-up on land).
93. See ODonnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36 (1943) (allow-
ing recovery to a deckhand injured when he went ashore to assist in repairs to the
vessel).
94. See Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155, 162 (1934).
95. 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959).
96. 742 F.2d 1054 (7th Cir. 1984). The Seventh Circuit was not the first to.enun-
ciate this standard, though the Supreme Court focused on the Johnson version in
McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 353-55. (1991). The test originated in
the First Circuit, in Carumbo v. Cape Cod S.S., 123 F.2d 991 (1st Cir. 1941).
Carumbo required that a seaman have a more or less permanent attachment to a
vessel in navigation and that he be aboard primarily to aid in navigation. See id. at
995. It would probably be more accurate, therefore, to designate this standard as the
Carumbo test; however, because the Supreme Court evaluated this test by reference
to the Johnson decision, and because the First Circuit later dropped the "aid in nav-
igation" requirement, this Note refers to it as the Johnson test.
1997] 733
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generally fell into either the Robison17 or the Johnson camp;"
the primary distinction between the two groups was the Johnson
test's requirement that a seaman aid in navigation.9
In Robison, the Fifth Circuit decided that a Jones Act case
should go to the jury if (1) the "workman was assigned perma-
nently to a vessel.., or performed a substantial part of his
work on the vessel and (2)... the duties which he performed
contributed to the function of the vessel or to the accomplish-
ment of its mission. . . ."' Applying this test to an oil field
worker stationed on a mobile offshore drilling platform, the
court concluded that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to
decide that Robison was a seaman.''
Focusing on the perils of the sea as a decisive factor, the Fifth
Circuit found that Robison faced risks similar to those of seamen
and that he, too, was in need of Jones Act protection." 2 Not-
withstanding the drilling platform's attachment to the Gulf floor,
the court reasoned that workers aboard platforms "share the
same marine risks [as other seamen and] in many instances ...
are exposed to more hazards than are blue-water sailors. They
run the risk of top-heavy drilling barges collapsing.""3
The Fifth Circuit departed from the activities-related test of
early Supreme Court cases.' Robison's work was outside the
scope of traditional seaman's duties; he did, however, perform
those duties on a "vessel"0 5 and contributed to the function of
97. See Hurst v. Pilings & Structures, Inc., 896 F.2d 504 (11th Cir. 1990); Bennett
v. Perini Corp., 510 F.2d 114 (1st Cir. 1975); Slatton v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co.,
506 F.2d 505 (8th Cir. 1974).
98. See Boyd v. Ford Motor Co., 948 F.2d 283 (6th Cir. 1991); Gizoni v. Southwest
Marine, Inc., 909 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1990), affd, 502 U.S. 81 (1991); Stephenson v.
McLean Contracting Co., 863 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1988); Simko v. C & C Marine
Maintenance Co., 594 F.2d 960 (3d Cir. 1979); Salgado v. M.J. Rudolph Corp., 514
F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1975).
99. See Johnson, 742 F.2d at 1061.
100. See Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 779 (5th Cir. 1959).
101. See id. at 781.
102. See id. at 780.
103. Id.
104. See Desper v. Starved Rock Ferry Co., 342 U.S. 187 (1952); Swanson v. Marra
Bros., 328 U.S. 1 (1946); O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36 (1943).
105. In addition to debating whether Robison was a seaman, see Robison, 266 F.2d
at 779, the parties debated whether a drilling platform could be classified as a vessel,
considering that the platform in question was attached to the bottom of the Gulf of
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that vessel."' 6 The Fifth Circuit admitted that the connection
between Robison's duties and the traditional work of seamen
was "minor," but his attachment to a vessel and the relationship
of his work to the function of the vessel made him a seaman. 10 7
Stressing navigation as a definitive duty for seamen, the Sev-
enth Circuit in Johnson v. John F. Beasley Construction Co.
required a seaman: (1) to be more-or-less permanently connected
to a vessel in navigation and (2) to contribute significantly to the
vessel's transportation function.0 8 The court denied seaman
status to the plaintiff, Johnson, who worked on a floating work
platform repairing a bridge.0 9 Though acknowledging that John-
son had a more-or-less permanent connection with a vessel in
navigation, the court found that his duties did not contribute to
the barge's navigation."0
The Seventh Circuit criticized the Robison test for giving
"insufficient weight to the relationship between the employee
and the transportation function of the vessel.""' Like the Fifth
Circuit in Robison," the Seventh Circuit structured its test
around the notion that the Jones Act should protect workers
who perform the traditional work of seamen."' Whereas the
Mexico and could only be moved by tugs. See id. at 772. The court decided that the
platform was "not a man-made island [but] a special purpose vessel, a floating drilling
platform." Id. at 779. See generally Jack L. Allbritton, Seaman Status in Wilander's
Wake, 68 TUL. L. REV. 373, 392-402 (1994) (discussing the definition of "vessel"); Da-
vid W. Robertson, A New Approach to Determining Seaman Status, 64 TEX. L. REv.
79, 100-05 (1985) (surveying vessel-connection jurisprudence); infra note 120.
106. See Robison, 266 F.2d at 779.
107. See i&
108. See 742 F.2d 1054, 1062-63 (7th Cir. 1984).
109. See id. at 1055-56. The court decided that the barge was a vessel, but cau-
tioned that a "waterborne structure [with] no transportation function... can have
no group performing navigational functions, and hence no maritime 'crew'." Id. at
1063 (footnotes omitted).
110. See id. at 1064.
111. Id. The court stated:
[Tihe second part of the Robison test strays from important Jones Act
principles when it speaks of the employee's duties as having to relate
only to the "function of the vessel or the accomplishment of its mission"
without further qualifying "function" and "mission7 in terms of the trans-
portation function and mission of the vessel.
Icl
112. See 266 F.2d at 774.
113. See Johnson, 742 F.2d" at 1061.
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Fifth Circuit defined seamen's work broadly in light of the reali-
ties of the modern seaman and recognized a wide array of sea-
work,"4 the Seventh Circuit focused narrowly on naviga-
tion.'15 Workers who were not involved in navigation fell out-
side the scope of the Jones Act because, in the Seventh Circuit's
reading, the Act's goal was "to provide protection for those sub-
jected to risks associated with the transportation function of
vessels on navigable waters." 6
In addition to the "aid in navigation""' requirement, the
Fifth and Seventh Circuits divided on two other aspects of sea-
man status. The Seventh Circuit, on one hand, required the
worker to have a more-or-less permanent connection to a vessel
in navigation."8 The Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, allowed
a worker to qualify as a seaman by proving either that he was
assigned permanently to a vessel or that he performed a sub-
stantial part of his work aboard a vessel."' Furthermore, the
Fifth Circuit did not require that the vessel be in navigation."
The substantial work alternative of Robison led to litigation
over how much work was "substantial."2' Especially in the
Fifth Circuit, courts have evaluated the substantial work alter-
native by comparing the percentage of the work done on board a
vessel to the work done on land.'22
114. See Robison, 266 F.2d at 774-78.
115. See Johnson, 742 F.2d at 1061-63.
116. Id. at 1061-62.
117. The phrase "aid in navigation" originated in Griffith v. Wheeling Pittsburgh
Steel Corp., 521 F.2d 31, 36-37 (3d Cir. 1975).
118. See Johnson, 742 F.2d at 1063.
119. See Robison, 266 F.2d at 779.
120. See id. Although the term "vessel" has instigated several Jones Act debates
centering on the fleet doctrine, the definition of vessel, and the navigation require-
ment, these issues are beyond the scope of this Note. See supra note 105.
121. See Allbritton, supra note 105, at 385-92.
122. See Latsis v. Chandris, Inc., 20 F.3d 45, 48 (2d Cir. 1994), affd, 115 S. Ct.
2172 (1995); Palmer v. Fayard Moving & Transp. Corp., 930 F.2d 437, 439 (5th Cir.
1991); Leonard v. Dixie Well Serv. & Supply, Inc., 828 F.2d 291, 295 (5th Cir.
1987); Barrett v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 781 F.2d 1067, 1076 (5th Cir. 1986). In
Barrett, the Fifth Circuit stated that when the substantiality of an employee's work
aboard a vessel becomes an issue, seaman status should be determined "in the con-
-text of [the worker's] entire employment with his current employer." Id. at 1075.
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AN INCHOATE ANSWER IN WILANDER
The Supreme Court rejected the Seventh Circuit's interpreta-
tion of the Jones Act in McDermott International, Inc. v.
Wilander.'r  Abandoning the early case law approach that de-
pended on the traditional work of seamen, the Court defined
seaman status "solely in terms of the employee's connection to a
vessel in navigation."" The specific type of work was unimpor-
tant: it mattered only that the worker be "doing the ship's
work."'
Wilander, assigned to a paint boat in the Persian Gulf, was
injured while inspecting a pipe on an oil platform.126 Applying
the Robison test,27 the jury found that Wilander was a sea-
man." McDermott appealed the Jones Act award, asking the
Supreme Court to reject the broad Robison requirement that a
seaman contribute to the vessel's function 9 in favor of the more
restrictive Johnson "aid in navigation" standard,3 ° thus pre-
cluding Wilander's Jones Act recovery.3 ' The Court granted
certiorari to resolve the conflict between the Johnson and Robison
tests: namely, whether a seaman must aid in navigation. 3 2
The Court looked for a historical seaman test, examining pre-
Jones Act cases for workers labeled "seamen."33 Although ear-
ly cases had required seamen to "hand, reef and steer" a ves-
sel," the Court found that many nineteenth century courts
123. 498 U.S. 337, 353-55 (1991).
124. See id. at 354.
125. Id. at 355.
126. See id. at 339.
127. See Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 779 (5th Cir. 1959) (establishiig
that a worker may be a seaman if he is assigned permanently to a vessel or per-
forms a substantial part of his work aboard the vessel and his duties contribute to
the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission).
128. See Wilander, 498 U.S. at 339-40.
129. See Robison, 266 F.2d at 779.
130. See Johnson v. John F. Beasley Constr. Co., 742 F.2d 1054, 1062-63 (7th Cir.
1984) (holding that to qualify for seaman status, a worker must not only be perma-
nently connected to a vessel in navigation, but also must contribute significantly to
the vessel's transportation function). See supra note 117.
131. Wilander, 498 U.S. at 340.
132. See iaL
133. See id. at 343-46.
134. See i& at 343 (citing The Canton, 5 F. Cas. 29, 30 (D. Mass. 1858) (No. 2,388)).
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had granted workers in nonnavigational jobs seaman bene-
fits." The Court concluded that at the time Congress enacted
the Jones Act, courts had not required seamen to navigate and
that "the time has come to jettison the aid in navigation lan-
guage."13 Because all workers on a ship in navigation face the
perils of the sea, the Supreme Court found that the Jones Act
should not favor workers who navigate.1
7
The Court's decision in Wilander signified the death of the
activities-related test of early Jones Act jurisprudence and a
recognition that the work of modern seamen is as varied as the
types of vessels on which they labor. Saying only that "a seaman
must be doing the ship's work,""8 the Wilander opinion min-
imized the significance of a putative seaman's duties.3 9 The
Court found a new touchstone for seaman status: an "employ-
ment-related connection to a vessel in navigation."4 ' The
Court based this decision upon the notion that "[aill who work
at sea in the service of a ship face those particular perils to
which the protection of maritime law ... is directed."
Although rejecting the Johnson test,' the Court refrained
from fully embracing the Fifth Circuit's approach by cau-
tiously restricting its holding to the issue of navigation.' The
Court declined to explain the plaintiff seaman's required connec-
tion to the vessel. 45 By not elaborating on this feature of the
test, the Court left the issue to the circuit courts.
46
135. See id. These occupations included cooks, firemen, engineers, carpenters, clerks,
and others who were granted remedies traditionally reserved for seamen. See id.
136. Id. at 353.
137. See id. at 354.
138. Id. at 355.
139. See id. at 353-55.
140. Id. at 355. The Court stated that "lilt is not the employee's particular job that
is determinative, but the employee's connection to a vessel." Id. at 354.
141. Id.
142. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
144. See Wilander, 498 U.S. at 356-57.
145. See id.
146. Nor did Wilander address the issue of compulsory pilots who are aboard a
particular ship only briefly and who are not attached to a vessel or fleet. See
Harwood v. Partredereit AF 15.5.81, 944 F.2d 1187 (4th Cir. 1991) (denying seaman
status to a compulsory pilot); Bach v. Trident S.S., 920 F.2d 322 (5th Cir.) (denying
seaman status to a compulsory pilot), vacated and remanded, 500 U.S. 949, reinstat-
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As illustrated by the Second Circuit's opinion in Latsis v.
Chandris, Inc.,'47 a significant issue raised by the inconclusive
Wilander decision was whether the seaman's connection to a
vessel had to be permanent or if it sufficed that he performed a
substantial amount of his work aboard the vessel, as the
Robison test had permitted.4" The Wilander decision gave no
indication whether the substantial work alternative remained
viable.14 9
ANOTHER EXAMINATION OF SEAMAN STATUS IN
CHANDRIS, INC. V. LATSIS
In the summer of 1995, the Supreme Court returned to the
issue of seaman status, elaborating on the connection to a vessel
that Wilander required. The Court's opinion in Chandris, Inc. v.
Latsis provided more detail regarding the Jones Act's applicabili-
ty but unnecessarily narrowed the Act's coverage. The restrictive
interpretation of the Jones Act in Latsis departed from prior
case law and its application will exclude some workers who "go
down to sea in ships"' from the Act's protection.
Latsis was employed as a superintendent electrical engi-
neer.15' Although Chandris's other electrical engineers each
were assigned to a single vessel, Latsis, as superintendent, was
based at the company's Miami office and supervised six ves-
sels.'52 His duties occasionally required him to travel aboard
Chandris vessels.5 ' On one such voyage, Latsis developed an
ed, 947 F.2d 1290 (5th Cir. 1991); Evans v. United Arab Shipping Co., 767 F. Supp.
1284 (D.N.J. 1991) (granting seaman status to a compulsory pilot), affd, 4 F.3d 207
(3d Cir. 1993).
147. 20 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 1994), affd, 115 S. Ct. 2172 (1995).
148. See id. at 46; see also Allbritton, supra note 105, at 385-92 (predicting the
demise of the substantial work alternative); Kenneth G. Engerrand, Seaman Status
Reconstructed, 32 S. TEX L. REV. 169, 182 (1991) (advocating that a seaman's duties
aboard a vessel be "co-exclusive with the duration of the voyage").
149. See McDermott Intl, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 354-55 (1991).
150. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 104 (1946) (Stone, C.J., dissenting)
(discussing those workers who subject themselves to the risks of a vessel's unseawor-
thiness, with little ability to avoid the dangers or recover from the responsible parties).
151. See Latsis, 20 F.3d at 47-48.
152. See id. at 48.
153. See id.
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eye problem that required immediate surgery."' The ship's
doctor negligently failed to send him ashore immediately, thus
causing a significant loss in vision.155 After surgery and recu-
peration, Latsis returned to the ship and sailed to Germany,
where he remained with the vessel during the six months it
spent in drydock undergoing renovations.55 He then returned
to the United States aboard the vessel.5 '
Latsis in the Lower Courts
The trial court instructed the jury that Latsis was a seaman if
he were permanently assigned to the vessel or if he had done a
substantial part of his work aboard the vessel.'58 In determin-
ing whether Latsis performed a substantial part of his work on
the vessel, the jury was not allowed to consider the time the
vessel spent in drydock because during that time it was out of
navigation.'59 On the basis of these instructions, the jury de-
nied seaman status to Latsis 6 °
The Second Circuit held that the trial court erred in excluding
from consideration the time that the vessel spent in drydock.'5 '
Vacating and remanding for a new trial,"2 the Second Circuit
instructed the trial court to find Latsis a seaman if (1) he con-
tributed to the mission of (2) either a vessel or a fleet, (3) his
contribution was substantial in either its duration or nature,
and (4) his employment regularly exposed him to the perils of
the sea."
The Second Circuit pointed to the Wilander decision's
shortcomings, noting that the opinion did not address the Fifth
and Seventh Circuits' conflicting requirements regarding the
154. See id. at 47.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 48-49.




161. See id. at 55-56.
162. See id. at 58.
163. See id. at 57.
164. McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337 (1991).
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nature of the seaman's connection to a vessel." Because the
Supreme Court had remained mute on the issue of what consti-
tutes a substantial connection to a vessel, the Second Circuit
constructed its own test."' Drawing primarily upon Wilander,
Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni, 67 and Salgado v. M.J.-
Rudolph Corp., c the court found that a seaman must make
substantial contributions to the vessel. 6 '
Reasoning that the Supreme Court had not expressly em-
braced the Robison substantial work alternative,171 the court
decided to maintain the Salgado test 7' but to rephrase it to
minimize the temporal nature of the connection, 72 conforming
it to Wilander. Criticizing the Robison substantial work alterna-
tive as a "temporal concept to be determined by the duration of
the putative seaman's connection to the vessel"' and hence
unnecessarily restrictive, the court proposed that a more appro-
priate test would be whether the worker's contributions to the
vessel were substantial, without regard to the'amount of time he
spent with the vessel. 74 The court also held that the vessel's
time in drydock should be considered in evaluating whether
Latsis's connection to the vessel was substantial. 75
165. See Latsis, 20 F.3d at 52.
166. See id. at 56-57.
167. 502 U.S. 81 (1991). Gizoni, decided shortly after Wilander, involved a worker
who received benefits under the L-WCA and brought suit under the Jones Act. See
id. at 84. Characterizing the Jones Act and LHWCA as being mutually exclusive,
the district court held as a matter of law that Gizoni was not a seaman. See id.
The Ninth Circuit reversed, 909 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1990), and the Supreme Court
affirmed. Gizoni, 502 U.S. at 92. The Court held that a worker covered by the
LHWCA may still be covered by the Jones Act even if his occupation is listed in the
LHWCA the two acts are not mutually exclusive. Id. at 91-92.
168. 514 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1975). The Salgado decision demonstrates the Second
Circuit's test for seaman status. Salgado belonged to the Johnson group of cases,
requiring that "the vessel must be in navigation, there must be a more or less per-
manent connection with the ship, and the worker must be aboard naturally and
primarily as an aid to navigation." Id. at 755 (citing Klarman v. Santini, 503 F.2d
29, 33 (2d Cir. 1974)).
169. See Latsis, 20 F.3d at 52-57.
170. See Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 779 (5th Cir. 1959).
171. See Salgado, 514 F.2d at 755.
172. See Latsis, 20 F.3d at 56-57.
173. Id. at 54.
174. See id. at 56-57.
175. See id.
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Latsis in the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to "resolve the continu-
ing conflict among the Courts of Appeals regarding the appropri-
ate requirements for seaman status under the Jones Act." 6
The Court considered the nature of a seaman's relationship with
a vessel and whether a jury should consider the time a vessel
spent in drydock in assessing that relationship. 77 The Court
identified four guiding principles of seaman status analysis.78
First, the class of seamen does not include land-based work-
ers.'79 Second, seaman status does not depend on the locus of
the worker's injury but on his relationship to a vessel."8 Third,
a maritime worker does not become a crew member the moment
a vessel leaves the dock.18" ' Finally, the Court stated that Jones
Act analysis is "fundamentally status-based."'82
The Court held that in addition to contributing to the function
of a vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission, a seaman
must have a connection to a vessel in navigation that is substan-
tial in terms of both duration and nature."S Although this test
resembled the Second Circuit's approach, 8' the Supreme Court
restricted its reach by including the temporal element that the
Second Circuit had virtually abandoned.1s'
The Second Circuit had defined seaman status carefully, with-
176. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 115 S. Ct. 2172, 2182 (1995).
177. See id. at 2190-93. As to the drydocking issue, the Court found that time
spent with a vessel out of navigation should not be considered in assessing the
plaintiffs connection with it. See id. at 2192. The determination of whether the
vessel is in navigation, however, is an issue for the jury and the trial court erred in
deciding it for them. See id. The Court went on to explain how a vessel in drydock
may still be in navigation. See id. at 2192-93.
178. See id. at 2184-86.
179. See id. at 2185.
180. See id. at 2185-86; see also O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318
U.S. 36 (1943) (granting Jones Act recovery to a deckhand who was injured while
ashore).
181. See Latsis, 115 S. Ct. at 2186.
182. Id. The Court stated that "land-based maritime workers do not become seamen
because they happen to be working on board a vessel when they are injured, and
seamen do not lose Jones Act protection when the course of their service to a vessel
takes them ashore." Id.
183. See id. at 2190.
184. See Latsis, 20 F.3d at 57.
185. See id. at 54; Latsis, 115 S. Ct. at 2191.
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out requiring a time commitment to the vessel.s Under the
Second Circuit's approach, a worker could qualify as a seaman if
his contributions to the vessel were substantial in either nature
or duration."7 Instead of contributions to a vessel, the Su-
preme Court looked for a connection." The Court required a
connection that was substantial, both in nature and in duration:
"[W]e think it is important that a seaman's connection to a ves-
sel... be substantial in both respects."'89 The different lan-
guage in the two decisions, though subtle, significantly alters
the meaning of the test.
Gently repudiating the Second Circuit's analysis, the Supreme
Court declared that time is an appropriate factor to consider in
determining seaman status."9 Though seaman status is "not
merely a temporal concept.., it necessarily includes a temporal
element."' 9' The Court cited the Fifth Circuit's standard that a
seaman must spend thirty percent of his time in the service of
the vessel, but quickly added that the figure was merely a
guide.'92 The Court claimed that a temporal element would not
foreclose Jones Act remedies to a previously land-based worker
reassigned to a lengthy voyage and injured on board.' The
Court's analysis, however, left open the question of how that
hypothetical worker would fare were he injured shortly after the
vessel left the harbor, or even while the vessel was still in the
harbor.
186. See Latsis, 20 F.3d at 57.
187. See .
188. See Latsis, 115 S. Ct. at 2190.
189. Id. at 2191 (emphasis added). A few times in its discussion, the Supreme
Court misquoted the Second Circuit version as a "requirement that the connection be
'substantial in terms of its (a) duration and (b) nature.'" Id. at 2188 (emphasis add-
ed). The Supreme Court later explained this difference as confusion in the Second
Circuit: "It is not clear which version ... the Court of Appeals intended to adopt
for the substantial connection requirement-or indeed whether the court saw a sig-
nificant difference between the two." Id. at 2191. A close reading of the Second
Circuit's opinion, however, reveals that the court deliberately chose the disjunctive in
the final formulation of its test, intending thereby to minimize if not eliminate the
temporal element from seaman status analysis. See Latsis, 20 F.3d at 54-57.
190. See Latsis, 115 S. Ct. at 2191.
191. Id.
192. See id.
193. See id. at 2192.
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Latsis argued that the Court should focus on the activities-
related purpose of the Jones Act, the protection of workers ex-
posed to the perils of the sea, and should include within the
Act's coverage anyone working on board in furtherance of the
vessel's mission during a voyage.14 The Court rejected this ap-
proach, dubbed the "voyage" test, claiming that it would contra-
dict earlier Supreme Court cases and the Court's interpretation
of the Jones Act.'95 It did not matter that the injury occurred
while the worker was on a voyage, the issue was the nature of
the worker's service to the vessel.'96 An employer, the Court
reasoned, needs to be able to predict which employees are cov-
ered by the Jones Act and which by the LHWCA.'97 Under a
voyage test, the Court claimed that a worker could walk into
and out of Jones Act protection daily.'98 The Court added that
the policy of the Jones Act was "to protect sea-based maritime
workers, who owe their allegiance to a vessel, and not land-
based employees, who do not."99
The Court's decision leaves Latsis and similarly situated
workers outside the scope of the Jones Act. Concurring, Justice
Stevens criticized the Court for ignoring the obvious: a worker
employed on a vessel, whose duties required him to be on that
vessel while it traveled from Miami to Bermuda and then to
Germany and back to the United States, was a seaman.2"0 Jus-
tice Stevens argued that there had always been a clear delinea-
tion between workers on a ship at sea and workers on a ship in
the harbor: the former are seamen per se; the latter present a
more ambiguous situation, one better suited for judicial
tests.20 ' Finally, Stevens criticized the majority for reading the
Jones Act as a protection for employers.2
194. See id. at 2184-85.
195. See id. at 2185.
196. See id. at 2185-87.
197. See id. at 2187.
198. See id.
199. Id. at 2194 (Stevens, J., concurring).
200. See id. at 2194-95 (Stevens, J., concurring).
201. See id. at 2194 (Stevens, J., concurring).




In Latsis and Wilander, the Supreme Court has constructed a
seaman status test based solely on the worker's relationship
with a vessel or fleet: A worker is a seaman if (1) he is connect-
ed to a vessel or fleet in navigation, (2) that connection is sub-
stantial both in duration and in nature, and (3) he contributes to
the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mis-
sion.2°3 This test falls short of providing the protection for sea-
men that Congress sought when it passed the Jones Act. By
excluding a worker such as Latsis, who fell prey to an historical
risk of the sea,2"4 the Court forsakes its own explanation of the
Jones Act's purpose.
Given the history of the Jones Act and the case law interpret-
ing it, the Latsis test is inconsistent and should be corrected. A
more appropriate test for determining seaman status is to re-
strict the elements identified in the Latsis and Wilander opin-
ions to the ambiguous situations of workers on board a vessel in
a harbor. In those cases, it is often difficult to ascertain whether
the worker should be covered by the LHWCA or the Jones Act,
and the detailed test that the Court delivered in Latsis and
Wilander is well suited to pick apart the facts and group the
workers accordingly.2"5 In situations such as Latsis's, however,
when the worker is injured at sea, seaman status should be
granted as a matter of law.2"6
203. See id. at 2194 (Stevens, J., concurring).
204. Inaccessible medical care is a peril historically faced by seamen:
[WIhile on board a seaman is very much reliant upon and in the care of
the ship's physician. If that physician is unqualified or engages in medi-
cal malpractice, it is just as much a peril to the mariner on board as the
killer wave, the gale or hurricane, or other dangers of the calling.
Id. at 2194 (Stevens, J., concurring). Although Latsis could have suffered a detached
retina on land, his injury was aggravated by his delay in reaching a hospital. See
id. at 2181. Because he was at sea, Latsis was at the mercy of the ship's doctor
and did not have access to other medical personnel or facilities. See id.
205. "When the extent and consequence of the employee's exposure to the seaman's
hazards is facially unclear, a test like the majority's may be appropriate. But no
ambiguity exists when an employee is injured on the high seas." Id. at 2196
(Stevens, J., concurring).
206. See id at.2194 (Stevens, J., concurring); see generally Beer, supra note 50, at
406-09 (suggesting that judges may be more qualified than juries to determine sea-
man status).
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Throughout Jones Act jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has
based seaman status evaluations on the idea that the policy
underlying the Jones Act is to protect those exposed to sea haz-
ards."7 In early cases, the Court used the traditional duties of
seamen as a method of determining whether a worker was ex-
posed to the perils of the sea; those engaged in traditional sea-
work were necessarily at risk and in need of Jones Act protec-
tion.2"8 By rejecting the locality test in Jones Act determina-
tions, the Court made a Jones Act inquiry status-based; seamen
are seamen even when on land, provided that they are on land
only briefly and not in pursuit of a separate occupation.2 9 The
Jones Act's purpose, however, is not to dole out relief to only
those workers classified by their employers as "sea-based," de-
spite the implications of the majority opinion in Latsis.210 The
history of the Act and the cases applying it show that the Act
does not defer to the employer's nomenclature. A more appropri-
ate way to view the cases granting Jones Act benefits to seamen
injured while on land is to recognize that a worker exposed to
the perils of the sea has earned Jones Act coverage and retains
it even when ordered ashore.1
Wilander, the Supreme Court's partial adoption of
Robison ,212 departed from the activities-related deliberations of
earlier Jones Act cases. 2" Dropping the activities-based analy-
sis did not mean abandonment of protection from the perils of
207. See David W. Robertson, The Law of Seaman Status Clarified, 23 J. MAR. L.
& COM. 1, 9 (1992); Robertson, supra note 105, at 92 ("The primary goal of the
seaman status jurisprudence is to afford the protection of the benevolent seamen's
remedies to all workers who confront the characteristic seamen's hazards."). But see
Cheavens, supra note 12, at 397-99 (arguing that the policy of the Jones Act is
"rooted in concepts of federalism" and not in the perils of the sea).
208. See, e.g., Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155, 157 (1934) ("[A] seaman is a mari-
ner of any degree, one who lives his life upon the sea."). Conversely, those not en-
gaged in the traditional work of seamen and hence not exposed to the perils of the
sea were not in need of Jones Act protection. See Desper v. Starved Rock Ferry Co.,
342 U.S. 187, 190-91 (1952) (denying seaman status to a worker who repaired ships
located on shore).
209. See Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 115 S. Ct. 2172, 2186 (1995).
210. See id.
211. See O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36, 39 (1943)
(awarding seaman status to a deckhand who was injured while ashore).
212. Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959).
213. See McDermott Intl, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 353-55 (1991).
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the sea as a central Jones Act policy. Rather, the Robison and
Wilander opinions acknowledge that all who work at sea in the
service of a vessel face the perils of the sea,21 even those
whose duties are unrelated to the traditional work of sea-
men.215 A worker attached to a vessel in navigation and per-
forming the work of that vessel is exposed to the perils of the
sea and therefore in need of Jones Act protection.
In Latsis, the Court veered from the course plotted in
Wilander. Purporting to follow the policy of the Jones Act, the
Court in Latsis reconstructed the Act as a protection for employ-
ers. The Court spoke of the Jones Act in terms of predictability,
rejecting the voyage test out of concern that it would somehow
affect the employer's ability to determine which workers were
covered by the Jones Act and which by the LHWCA.2 16 Given
that the employer picks the crew for each voyage, granting sea-
man status to workers at sea would not inconvenience the em-
ployer. In focusing on the worker's relationship with the vessel,
the Court ignored the fact that anyone who works at sea is vul-
nerable to sea hazards, not just those who are assigned there
permanently by their employers.2 7
In rejecting a substantial work alternative, the Court permits
employers to manipulate Jones Act claims by permanently as-
signing a worker to an office and then, as in Latsis's case, re-
quiring him to work aboard vessels for extended periods.2 8
Robison recognized that there is more than one way to achieve
seaman status; workers formally assigned to an office but who
regularly work aboard their employers' vessels nonetheless are
seamen.29 As predicted by Jack L. Allbritton, "[tihe elimina-
214. Id. at 354 ("All who work at sea in the service of a ship face those particular
perils to which the protection of maritime law . . . is directed."); Robison, 266 F.2d
at 780 (extending Jones Act protection to workers on an oil platform because they
"share the same marine risks" borne by other seamen).
215. Workers who do not "hand, reef and steer" the vessel. Wilander, 498 U.S. at
343 (citing The Canton, 5 F. Cas. 29, 30 (D. Mass. 1858) (No. 2,388)).
216. See Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 115 S. Ct. 2172, 2186-87 (1995).
217. "I think it is a novel construction of the Jones Act to read it as a scheme to
protect employers." Id. at 2198 (Stevens, J., concurring).
218. But see Engerrand, supra note 148, at 180-83 (arguing that a permanent as-
signment test is consistent with the Wilander decision jettisoning the aid in naviga-
tion test).
219. This result was made possible by the Robison tests substantial work alterna-
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tion of the substantial work alternative would amount to a re-
strictive interpretation of the Jones Act, a remedial statute that
has heretofore always been construed liberally and broadly."22
The Latsis test seems to require that a worker complete more
than one voyage.22' Although stressing a temporal relationship
to the vessel, the test leaves open the question of precisely how
long a seaman must be assigned to the vessel.222 Undoubtedly,
the confusion surrounding the Jones Act would be resolved best
by Congress amending its seventy-five-year-old statute to define
the term "seaman." In the absence of Congressional action, how-
ever, it is imperative that the Court reassess its Jones Act inter-
pretation to correct the damage rendered by Latsis, bringing the
case law into line with the policy behind the Jones Act.
CONCLUSION
In Latsis, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to issue a
definitive opinion on the qualifications for seaman status, an
issue that has plagued courts for years. Although the "search for
a bright-line test of seaman status is futile"' and the issue
will probably not be resolved until Congress again chooses to
address it, and perhaps not even then, the Court could have
used the Latsis case as an opportunity to identify a class of
workers who are obviously seamen and thereby remove them
from the Jones Act debate. By failing to do so, the Court in
Latsis further confused an already convoluted jurisprudence,
suggesting that one exposed to the perils of the sea might not be
a seaman.
Anne Norris Graham
tive. See Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 779 (5th Cir. 1959).
220. Allbritton, supra note 105, at 390.
221. See Latsis, 115 S. Ct. at 2190.
222. See id. at 2191.
223. Robertson, supra note 105, at 84.
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